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Crime on college campuses is a growing and pervasive problem for many
institutions of higher education. In light of this alarming trend, many universities
have organized student disciplinary boards in an effort to deal with student
offenders within the university community, and without police involvement.
These student disciplinary boards have begun to adjudicate complex criminal
issues, rangingfrom theft to assault and rape, and are almost always carried out
in secret. The result of this practice is that student offenders suffer only the most
nominal ofpunishments, and other students on campus remain unaware that a
crime has even taken place. One crucial piece offederal legislation, the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), has allowed universities to shield
this disciplinary information from the public by requiring universities to keep a
student's educational records confidential. Many schools have thus interpreted
disciplinary records as "educational records" in an effort to avoid potentially
losing millions of dollars in federal aid. The author argues, here, that FERPA
must be amended in such a way as to give universities a clear indication that
disciplinary records are not "educational records" and, furthermore, that
universities must be forced to affirmatively disclose information relating to crime
on their campuses in an effort to protect their students.
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1995, a first-year Miami University student1 and some friends
from her dorm set out for one of the many parties that were in progress that
weekend in Oxford, Ohio. The party was hosted by one of the University's
varsity wrestlers and was held in a house rented by students. The house was
located not even a mile from the University campus.
After spending several hours at the party, the student fell asleep in one of the
upstairs bedrooms. She reported having fallen asleep on her stomach, next to one
* This Note is dedicated to my family, Ric, Debbie, and Kara, for their many years of
tireless love and support, and to Patrick, for everything. Thanks to all of you for never letting
me forget there was a light at the end of this tunnel. I would also like to extend my special
thanks to Bill Mandel, without whose friendship and feedback, none of this would have been
possible.
1 The victim chose to identify herself only as 'Erin R." See Nina Bernstein, College
Campuses Hold Court in Shadows of Mixed Loyalties, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, at BI
(discussing the problems involved with secret campus disciplinary boards and detailing the
rape of the Miami University student).
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of her friends from her dorm.2 Not long after, the student was awakened by the
party's host, a 190 pound wrestler, who was pinning her down and penetrating
her from behind.3 She screamed and struggled but was unable to ward off the
attacker. The friend, lying next to the student, witnessed the entire scene.4
Soon after the alleged incident took place, the student reported the assault to
the Oxford Police. According to representatives from that agency, the police
encouraged her to press charges; according to the student, however, the
prosecutor assigned to the case was hostile and did all he could to discourage her
from going forward.5 Susan Vaughn, the University's Judicial Affairs
Coordinator, later intervened and suggested the student and her attacker attempt
mediation, as the problem was merely a "misunderstanding."6 The student
reluctantly agreed to a disciplinary board hearing, in hopes that her attacker
would at least have to answer to the University for his actions. Though she
already had a written apology from him,7 she hoped for some greater
vindication.
The disciplinary hearing lasted four hours, and the disciplinary board,
composed of two professors and two students, took only twenty minutes to
deliberate. The result: Aaron Grossman, the attacker, was guilty of violating a
provision of the Miami University Student Code of Conduct, "Physical or
Psychological Abuse of Others." For his actions, Grossman was placed on
"student conduct probation," a label that carried with it no suspension. Because
the hearing was handled through the University's own disciplinary board and
thus kept secret, Grossman was shielded from public backlash. The female
student continued to run into her attacker at various places around campus. And
Miami University, for the period from January to June 1995, reported not a
single rape in its annual campus crime-report.8
The above incident highlights the essence of an all too common problem at
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 According to Erin, the prosecutor suggested that no jury would take seriously a woman
who had willingly gone to a party, drank alcohol all night, and then fell asleep at the host's
house. See id.
6 See id.
7 Among other things, the apology implored, "Although I hurt you very seriously, I pray
to you that you won't destroy my life.'Id.
8 The rape of Erin R. was rationalized as an "off-campus" rape, and thereby not required
by law to be reported. In fact, twenty-one other rapes that occurred in the same time period also
went unreported. This latter group of rapes was ignored as having been reported to off-campus
counselors, hospital personnel, and others who were under no legal duty to report the crimes to
the University. See id.
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many of the nation's colleges and universities-the secret disciplinary board.
Organized to deal with standard college infractions, such as academic dishonesty
and underage drinking, these boards today adjudicate complex criminal issues
ranging from theft, to assault and rape. Because these matters are disposed of
largely in secret, educational institutions-like Miami University-are able to
avoid disclosure of these crimes, thereby enhancing the school's image and
avoiding the potential loss of millions of dollars in federal aid.9 Indeed, these
institutions often claim to be prevented from releasing this information, even
when they are willing to do so, because of one crucial piece of legislation-the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("Act," "Buckley," or "FERPA"). 10
Buckley, enacted in 1974, was intended to protect the privacy rights of
students by limiting third-party access to their educational records.1' At its most
basic level, Buckley permits access to student educational records by parents,
students, and necessary school administrators and teachers, while denying access
to most third parties.12 Buckley's only enforcement mechanism lies in the
conditioning of federal funding to educational institutions on their compliance
with Buckley's procedures; schools that violate its terms stand to lose millions of
dollars in federal aid. 13
Though Buckley itself has been substantively amended four times since its
enactment in 1974,14 much confusion persists among institutions of higher
9 See infra Part III.C.
10 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994 & Supp. 1998) (named for its sponsor, James Buckley).
I1 See id § 1232g(b)(1) ("No funds shall be made available... to any educational agency
or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records... of
students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or
organization ... '
12 See id. § 1232g(a)(1XA), (b)(1) (denying funds to educational institutions that release
students' educational records).
13 Miami University, for example, stood to lose forty-million dollars in federal finding
for the release of confidential student information. See School Paper, School Await Records
Decision, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 31, 1997, at B4 (detailing the events surrounding the
lawsuit filed by The Miami Student against Miami University).
14 In 1979, Buckley was amended to allow for disclosure of records without parental
consent to educational authorities conducting audits and program evaluations. See Education
Laws of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-46, § 4(c), 93 Stat. 338, 342 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(5) (1994)). In 1990, Buckley was amended to coordinate its provisions with those
of the Campus Security Act (CSA), which requires disclosure of crime statistics on college
campuses. See Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
542, § 204, 104 Stat. 2381, 2385-87 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (1994)). In
1992, Buckley's language was amended to exclude campus law enforcement records from the
definition of "educational records.' See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-325, § 1555(a), 106 Stat. 448, 840 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii)
(1994)). Note, however, that law enforcement records and disciplinary records are not the
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education over the exact meaning of Buckley's use of the term "educational
records." While it is clear from the language of Buckley that campus law
enforcement agencies' records on students are not "educational records" within
the meaning of the Act,15 the same cannot be said of records that are kept by
university disciplinary boards. 16 The result has been that many schools
opportunistically classify disciplinary records as confidential educational records
that are protected by Buckley. Thereby the universities are insulated from public
scrutiny about the events and outcomes surrounding major campus crimes.
This Note details the opportunistic use of Buckley by institutions of higher
education and offers a critical analysis of Buckley's major weakness-the
ambiguity surrounding the term "educational records." Part I explains the
mandates of Buckley and highlights the interpretation of Buckley by both
same. Additionally, in 1994, Buckley was amended to provide greater parental access to
records, while easing Buckley's burden on schools. See Improving America's Schools Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(J),
(b)(1)(E), (b)(4)(B), and (h) (1994)). To trace the amendments to Buckley since its enactment,
see Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute
Work, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 617,620-22 (1997).
15 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) ('CThe term 'education records' does not
include ... records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational agency or
institution that were created by that law enforcement unit for the purpose of law
enforcement."). Note the peculiar and arbitrary distinction the exception for law enforcement
records draws. Had Aaron Grossman had the misfortune of answering to the Miami campus
police force, the records surrounding the incident would have been available to the public at
large. However, because the campus police did not have jurisdiction over Aaron's "off-
campus" residence (and thus were not involved in the case's disposition), and because Miami
chose to resolve the matter on its own, Aaron was able to enjoy the benefits of Miami's secret
disciplinary system. Such a result hardly seems principled, particularly when a university can
influence the disposition of a case that originated off-campus (as in the Miami example, in
which the local police actually had jurisdiction to begin with). A university's decision as to
how to dispose of the matter thus seems to matter more than whether the particular offense
occurred on- or off-campus.
Indeed, even allowing college students the benefit of disciplinary boards is problematic.
One can imagine a case where an eighteen year old college student is sent before a disciplinary
board for rape, while his eighteen year old counterpart merely living in a college town, but not
attending the college, is prosecuted for the same crime to the fullest extent of the law. That
Congress has provided for such an arbitrary system hardly seems just.
16 Note, however, that an effective exclusio unis argument could be made in support of
the notion that disciplinary records are educational records. That is, by enumerating the several
types of records that are clearly not educational records, Congress intended for all other types
of records to be considered "educational" for purposes of Buckley. On the other hand, one
might argue that because Congress specifically exempted law enforcement records from the
definition of educational records, it intended for information about crimes generally to be
beyond the reach of Buckley.
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universities and courts. Part II lays out the crux of the problem inherent in
Buckley--the idea that Congress has passed legislation that makes it more
beneficial for colleges and universities to bury information by way of Buckley
than disclose in accordance with the Campus Security Act. Part IV analyzes
recent legislation proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives. To close
Buckley's major loophole, this legislation would ensure that students attending
our nation's colleges and universities receive full information regarding campus
crime. Part V both critiques this legislation and proposes recommendations for
dealing with the problem. Finally, Part VI concludes by explaining that
Congress, in order to compel fill disclosure by school officials, must remove the
existing incentives for concealing disciplinary information.
I. BucKLEY's "MANDATE"
A. Buckley's Plain Language and the Meaning of "Educational Records"
Enacted in 1974, Buckley had two goals as its purpose: 17 (1) to provide to
parents and students a right of access to a student's records18 and an opportunity
to challenge the accuracy of those records,19 and (2) to prevent other
unauthorized third parties from gaining access to private student files.20 Buckley
was originally introduced as a Senate floor amendment to the General Education
Provisions Act by Senator James Buckley.21 Rather than affirmatively require
the release of information to parents and students, Buckley instead mandates
only that federal funding be withheld from those institutions that deny parents
access to their children's records.22 Rather than affirmatively require that
institutions deny access to student records to third parties, Buckley instead
17 See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Litigation Involving FERPA, 110 West's Ed. Law Rep. 897,
897 (1996) (providing a basic overview of Buckley and highlighting several court cases from
across the country involving Buckley).
18 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX1XA), (B) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
19 See id. § 1232g(aX2).
20 See Daggett, supra note 14, at 620 (explaining the goals of lawmakers in passing
Buckley).
21 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1235.
22 See id. § 1232g(aX1XA), which states:
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational
agency or institution which has a policy of denying... the parents of students who are or
have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may
be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children.
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mandates that federal funding will be withdrawn if such records are released.23
Because Buckley was introduced as a floor amendment to pending
legislation, there was very little deliberation on the matter before the Act's
passage.24 Only a scant amount of floor debate actually took place, and there
were no hearings held or committee reports written on the topic. Further, the Act
contains no preface or statement of purpose2 5 The only definitive remarks
surrounding the Act's passage came from Senator Buckley himself, who stated
only that the statute was intended to address "the growing evidence of abuse of
student records across the nation."26 Thus, the hurried setting in which the Act
was promulgated helps to explain why so many problems have arisen in regard
to Buckley's provisions.27
What is the Buckley mandate, then, with respect to educational
institutions?28 For purposes of this Note, the mandate has two components: (1) it
23 See supra note 11.
24 See Daggett, supra note 14, at 620 (discussing the scant amount of legislative history
that exists on Buckley). See generally T. Page Johnson, Managing Student Records: The
Courts and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 79 West's Edu. Law Rep.
1 (1993) (summarizing the legislative background of Buckley).
25 See Daggett, supra note 14, at 622.
26 121 CoNG. REc. 13,990 (1975). These remarks were not made in Congress, but in an
address to the Legislative Conference of the National Congress of Parents and Teachers on
March 12, 1975. Desperate judges, guided by no substantive legislative history, have often
turned to this address for guidance when attempting to interpret Buckley. See Johnson, supra
note 24, at 3 (detailing the absence of legislative history in regards to Buckley).
27 See Johnson, supra note 24, at 2:
There is scant legislative history to explain FERPA's purposes or guide judicial
interpretation of its meaning. Congress offered no opportunity to those affected by the Act
to be heard on the merits of FERPA prior to its enactment FERPA was not subjected to
the usual process of legislative committee study and review, and there were no public
hearings to receive testimony from interested institutions and individuals.
Id.
28 As has already been explained, Buckley, in reality, afrmatively compels an institution
to do nothing in particular. Rather, Buckley provides that federal funding will be withheld from
institutions that fail to comply with certain record access requirements. See, e.g., Student Bar
Ass'n v. Byrd, 239 S.E.2d 415, 419 (N.C. 1977) (noting that Buckley is not a law that prohibits
the disclosure of student records, but instead imposes a funding precondition for
nondisclosure); see also Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1991) ("FERPA
is not a law which prohibits disclosure of educational records. It is a provision which imposes a
penalty for the disclosure of educational records."). The author asks what Buckley "directs"
universities to do only for simplicity's sake. It may be said, however, that by threatening the
withdrawal of millions of dollars in federal aid, Congress has effectively directed institutions to
do something-keep student records confidential.
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withdraws federal funding from any educational agency or institution29 that
denies parents the right to inspect and review the educational records of their
children;30 and (2) it withdraws federal funding from any educational agency or
institution that has a "policy or practice" of permitting the release of student31
education records or personally identifiable information contained within such
records without the written consent of parents.32 This Note focuses on the
dissemination (or lack thereof) of educational reports by colleges and
universities. However, particular attention must also be paid to the provision that
withdraws funding for the release of student records.
1. Exceptions to Bucldey's Ban on Releasing Student's Educational
Records
While as a general rule colleges and universities may not release educational
records, or other personally identifiable information, to third parties, Buckley
29 By its own terms, Buckley affects nearly all educational institutions within the United
States. The statute defines "educational agency or institution" as "any public or private agency
or institution which is the recipient of funds under an applicable program." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(a)(3) (1994). The Act similarly covers both federal and state agencies. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(a)(1)(B). Note, however, that "applicable federal program" refers to funds
disseminated by the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), not funds distributed by other
departments. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 (1997) (listing applicable federal programs). Merely
enrolling students who receive federal student aid is enough to satisfy this low standard. See
Daggett, supra note 14, at 623 n.44 ("[R]eceipt of federally-funded or federally-guaranteed
financial aid makes a university subject to Buckley."). Thus, nearly all colleges and universities
fall under the ambit of Buckley.
30 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).
31 Those "students" affected by Buckley include "any person with respect to whom an
educational agency or institution maintains educational records or personally identifiable
information." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6). An exception is made for those who have not actually
attended the particular institution (for example, those who have been accepted to an institution,
but are not yet in attendance). See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. Alternatively, those who have attended
an institution, but have either graduated from or otherwise left that institution, may or may not
be covered. One case has indicated that policy reasons may favor the release of otherwise
protected information. See Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576, 581 (5th Cir.
1987). In Klein, a teacher sought to prevent disclosure of old transcripts contained within her
personnel file. See id. at 578. Holding that the personnel file, including the transcripts, could be
opened, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the public's interest in access to a
teacher's records outweighs the individual teacher's privacy interest in her transcript. See id.
Admittedly, the result may be different if the individual at issue was a recent graduate of an
institution or if there were not strong policy reasons in favor of disclosure. Generally speaking,
those currently attending a college or university receive the greatest protection.
32 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1).
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contains several noteworthy exceptions. 33 First, release of such information may
be made to other school officials, including teachers, who have a legitimate
educational interest in the material.34 Second, such information may be released
to state and local officials or authorities, as long as a state statute authorizes such
a release. 35 Third, educational records generally may be released with the written
consent of the student's parents.36 While all are important, none of these
exceptions does much to facilitate the release of information contained in
disciplinary board reports.
2. The Meaning of "Educational Record"
What is perhaps more important than the enumerated exceptions is the
definition articulated for the term "educational records." 37 Bucldey's provisions
33 Although the focus here is on only three exceptions which are germane to this Note,
Buckley actually provides for several others. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(B) (release may be
made to officials of other school systems in which the student seeks to enroll); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(1)(C) (release may be made to the Comptroller General of the United States, the
Secretary of Education, or state educational authorities); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(D) (release
may be made in connection with a student's application for financial aid); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(1)(F) (release may be made to organizations conducting studies for educational
institutions); and 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I) (release may be made in connection with an
emergency).
34 A determination of whether an official has such a legitimate interest must be made by
the agency or institution. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A).
35 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(E) (information may be released to "State and local
officials or authorities to whom such information is specifically allowed to be reported or
disclosed pursuant to State statute. .. ").
36 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) ("No funds shall be made available.., to any educational
agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education
records ... without the written consent of their parents... .. ). Also, note that limited
information may be released in order to list a student in the school's directory. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(a)(5)(A). This information may include the student's name, address, telephone
number, date and place of birth, major field of study, participation in school activities and
sports, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, weight and height of athletic team
members, and the most recent previous institution attended by the student. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(a)(5)(A). In most cases, however, in order for this information to be lawfully
published, the school must have designated such information as directory material before the
publication. See, e.g., Krauss v. Nassau Community College, 469 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1983) (holding that Buckley prohibits the release of enrolled students' names and
addresses when such information has not been designated by the school as directory
information).
37 Indeed, much litigation and continued confusion surrounds the precise meaning of this
term. See, e.g., Tarka v. Cunningham, 917 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1990) (whether physics
professor's grading process could be scrutinized by a student as part of his "educational
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contain the following definition of "educational records": "those records, files,
documents, and other materials which contain information directly related to a
student."38 The term does not include records of instructional, supervisory, and
administrative personnel that are in the sole possession of those personnel, 39
records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational agency or
institution,40 or records on students made and maintained by physicians,
psychiatrists, psychologists, or other recognized professionals in connection with
the treatment of that student.41 The definition is thus intentionally broad. The
definition includes most information that is personally identifiable information,
such as social security numbers, 42 the student's name, parents' or other family
members' names, lists of personal characteristics, or other similar information.43
record"); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 1987) (whether
teacher's college transcript was an education record within meaning of Buckley); Flannery v.
Board of Trustees of Illinois Community College, No. 96C50184, 1996 WL 663918, at *4
(N.D. fI1. Nov. 4, 1996) (whether disclosure of nursing student's grade on a paper to other
students was disclosure of education record); see also John A. Scanlan, Playing the Drug
Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, and the Structures of Constitutional
Argument, 62 IND. L.J. 863, 956-58 (1986-1987) (discussing the application of Buckley to
student athlete drug testing); Mary H.B. Gelfinan & Nadine C. Schwab, School Health
Services and Educational Records: Conflicts in the Law, 64 West's Ed. Law Rep. 319 (1991)
(discussing the problems that Buckley poses with regard to student health records). The case of
The Miami Student v. Miami University will be discussed infra Part II.B.2.
38 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (1994).
3 9 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B) ("The term 'education records' does not
include.. . records of instructional, supervisory, and administrative personnel and educational
personnel ancillary hereto which are in the sole possession of the maker thereof and which are
not accessible or revealed to any other person except a substitute.").
40 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) ("[The term 'education record' does not include]
records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational agency or institution that were
created by that law enforcement unit for the purpose of law enforcement."). Note, however,
that this exemption does not address the issue of disciplinary boards; it applies only to campus
law enforcement units.
41 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv) ("[The term 'education record' does not include]
records on a student... made or maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other
recognized professional or paraprofessional acting in his professional or paraprofessional
capacity .... ).
4 2 See generally Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246, 1259 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that
students could enjoin school from distributing class rosters that list students by name and social
security number); Alexander C. Papandreou, Krebs v. Rutgers: The Potentialfor Disclosure of
Highly Confidential Personal Information Renders Questionable the Use of Social Security
Numbers as Student Identification Numbers, 20 J.C. & U.L. 79, 92-95 (1993) (discussing the
difficulties surrounding the use of students' social security numbers as school identification
numbers in light of the district court's ruling in Krebs).
43 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (1997) (detailing the categories of personally identifiable
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The current problem concerning university disciplinary records exists for
two reasons: (1) absent from Buckley's treatment of educational records is any
clear statement regarding in which category disciplinary records kept by a
university fall, and (2) a separate provision in Buckley specifically authorizes
university officials to incorporate disciplinary records into the educational
records of students.44  These two facts have allowed universities to
opportunistically shield damaging disciplinary records from public and student
scrutiny. Congress, by drafting this piece of legislation the way it did, has
effectively put its imprimatur on the cover-up of campus crime.
B. Buckley as Interpreted by the Courts
Buckley has spawned much litigation in both state and federal courts on a
diverse range of issues.45 These issues have included parental access,46 student
access,47 the proper remedies for those who have been damaged by the release of
information, 48 and the constitutionality of Buckley in general.49 Relatively little
information).
44 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(h) (1994 & Supp. 1998) ("Nothing in this section shall prohibit
an educational agency or institution from including appropriate information in the education
record of any student concerning disciplinary action taken against such student for conduct
which posed a significant risk to the safety or well-being... of other students").
45 For a thorough discussion of litigation involving Buckley, see Mawdsley, supra note
17; Johnson, supra note 24.
4 6 See Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986). In Fay, a father
with joint legal custody of his children, pursuant to a divorce agreement, sued the school
district due to the school superintendent's failure to provide him with information contained in
his children's educational records. See id. at 24. The court found that, under applicable New
York law, joint custodial parents must have equal access to the educational records of their
children. See id. at 34.
In Webster Grove School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., parents of a disabled child
filed suit to prevent access by a newspaper to a disciplinary report prepared about their child for
allegedly threatening other students with a handgun. See Webster Grove Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer
Publ'g Co., 898 F.2d 1371, 1373 (8th Cir. 1990). The newspaper claimed its First Amendment
rights prevented the school system from sealing the disciplinary report. See id. at 1374. Holding
that Buckley prevented disclosure of the child's file, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that the newspaper's interest in access to the files was outweighed by the student's
privacy interest. See id. at 1377.
47 For example, in Tarka v. Cunningham, an undergraduate student invoked Buckley to
challenge a grade he received in a physics course. See Tarka v. Cunningham, 917 F.2d 890,
891 (5th Cir. 1990). Holding that the student had no right to access his teacher's grade book
and other materials, the court noted that Buckley does not create a "statutory vehicle" for
challenging professors' grading processes. See id. at 892.
4 8 See, e.g., Francois v. University of the Dist. of Columbia, 788 F. Supp. 31, 32 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (holding that Buckley provides for no private cause of action); Norris v. Board of
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litigation, however, has focused on the proper treatment to be afforded
disciplinary records under the Act. Two cases, however, do merit attention as
being uniquely focused on this particular issue. The first case is Red & Black
Publishing Co., Inc. v. Board of Regents.50 The second case is The Miami
Student v. Miami University.51
1. Red & Black Publishing Co., Inc. v. Board of Regents
The Red & Black, the University of Georgia's student newspaper, filed suit
in state court against the Board of Regents in an effort to compel the University
to disclose records and proceedings of the Student Judiciary.52 The University
created the Student Judiciary to deal with the discipline of students and student
organizations and charged it with hearing and adjudicating alleged violations of
University rules.53 In this case, the student court was responsible for the
adjudication of offenses perpetrated by some of the school's fraternities and
sororities.54
Educ. of Greenwood Community Sch. Corp., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1452 (S.D. Ind. 1992)
(holding that a § 1983 cause of action is inapplicable in cases where a student or his parents
have released otherwise confidential information to other people in the school system);
Maynard v. Greater Hoyt Sch. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D.S.D. 1995) (holding that
§ 1983 is an appropriate remedy when a student has been damaged by the unlawful release of
confidential student information).
Courts have consistently denied the existence of a private cause of action under
Buckley-meaning that only the Secretary of Education can sanction a school for
noncompliance. See, e.g., Odom v. Columbia Univ., 906 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that a student does not have a private cause of action under Buckley); Allen v. Board
of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., No. 93C380, 1993 WL 388938, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (holding that Buckley does not provide for a private cause of action).
49 See, e.g., Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 594 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that if
Buckley was applied in such a way as to prevent disclosure of privately-commissioned reports
regarding campus crime, Buckley would violate the First Amendment rights of students).
Indeed, the tension between Buckley and freedom of information acts across the fifty states
provides another significant area of conflict. See generally Daggett, supra note 14, at 650-51.
Most states that have freedom of information acts provide that applicable information must be
disclosed unless otherwise provided by federal law-hence the conflict with Buckley. See, e.g.,
Ohio Public Records Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Anderson 1994) (excluding from
the definition of public records those records "the release of which is prohibited by state or
federal law").
50 427 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1993).
51 680 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1997).
52 See Red & Black, 427 S.E.2d at 259.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 260.
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After unsuccessfully petitioning the University for access to the records of
the Student Judiciary, The Red & Black brought suit under Georgia's Open
Records Act.55 The University, however, maintained that the records requested
by the newspaper were protected by Bucdey and thus could not be accessed
under the Open Records Act.56 The trial court granted the newspaper's request
for access to the records of the Student Judiciary, and the University appealed.57
Affirming the trial court's decision in favor of The Red & Black, the Georgia
Supreme Court explained, "we do not believe the documents sought are
'education records' within the meaning of the Buckley Amendments."'58
According to the court; "the records are not of the type... the Buckley
Amendment... is intended to protect, e.g., those relating to individual student
academic performance, financial aid, or scholastic probation." 59 Furthermore, the
court noted, the records at issue were maintained in the Office of Judicial
Programs, and not at the Registrar's office where bona fide educational records
were held.60 The University was thus forced to comply with the Open Records
Act and release the requested information to The Red & Black
2. The Miami Student v. Miami University
In July of 1996, The Miami Student, Miami University's student-run
newspaper, filed suit in state court in an effort to force Miami University to
release student disciplinary records compiled over a three-year period.61 The
Miami Student intended to compile these records in order to build a database to
track campus crime and punishments handed down to student offenders over a
three-year period.62
In the spring of 1995, the editor of The Miathi Student made her first request,
which was flatly refused by the University, for the Disciplinary Board
information. 63 Her successor made a second request pursuant to the Ohio Public
Records Act 64 the following year, and was given only the most insignificant
55 GA. CODEANN. § 50-18-70(a) (1998).
56 SeeRed&Black 427 S.E.2d at 261.
57 See id. at 259.
58 Id. at 261.
59Id.
60 See id.
61 See DAYTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 13, at B4.
62 eMiami U. to Appeal Student-Records Case, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 7, 1997, at
B9 (detailing the decision handed down against Miami University by the Ohio Supreme
Court).
63 See The Miami Student v. Miami Univ., 680 N.E.2d 956,957 (Ohio 1997).
64 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Anderson 1994) ("All public records shall
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information surrounding campus crime and the University's Disciplinary Board
practices. 65 According to Miami University officials, Buckley prevented the
school from adequately supplying the requested information.66 It was the
University's contention that the files maintained by its Disciplinary Board were
educational records within the meaning of Buckley and, therefore, were not
available for inspection.67
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the University's position
and granted The Miami Student's writ of mandamus to compel disclosure of the
requested information. 68 According to the court, a university's disciplinary board
records are not "educational records" within the meaning of Buckley because
they "do not contain educationally related information, such as grades or other
academic data, and are unrelated to academic performance, financial aid, or
scholastic performance." 69 Furthermore, the court reasoned, without full access
to such vital information, student safety is compromised. 70 The court ordered
University officials to disclose the requested information and delete only
personally identifiable information such as social security numbers, the student's
identification number, and the specific time and date upon which the incident
occurred.71 The location of the incident, the age and sex of the parties involved,
the nature of the offense, and the punishment handed down by the Board all were
to be included.72
Still unhappy with the verdict, and featful of losing forty-million dollars in
federal aid for complying with the order,73 Miami University petitioned for
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The petition, however, was denied,
letting stand the Ohio Supreme Court's decision compelling disclosure.74
be... made available for inspection... [i]n order to facilitate broader access to public
records....').
65 The University deleted not only names, ages, and genders of those involved in campus
crimes and disciplinary board actions, but also the location of the crimes, the times at which
they occurred, the date on which they occurred, and the disposition of the matter within the
Disciplinary Board. See The Miami Student, 680 N.E.2d at 957.
66 See id.
6 7 See id. at 958.
68 See id. at 960.
69 Id. at 959.
70 See id.
71 In the court's opinion, this could lead to the identity of the student. See id.
72 See id. at 959-60.
73 See DAYTON DAILY NEws, supra note 13, at B4.
74 See Miami Univ. v. Miami Student, 118 S. Ct. 616 (1997).
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3. Analysis of Courts' Treatment ofBuckley
What is perhaps most startling about the courts' opinions in the above cases
is not that the courts compelled disclosure; rather, it is the reasoning the courts
used to do so. Like the Georgia Supreme Court; the Ohio Supreme Court in the
Miami case relied upon a determination that the records at issue did not contain
"educationally related information. '75 Thus these two courts have effectively
read into Buckley a requirement that educational records consist of information
related to academic performance, financial aid, or scholastic performance. Yet
conspicuously absent from the language of Buckley is any such interpretation of
"educational records." 76 Indeed, Buckley has been understood by many to
encompass a broad range of information on students in its definition of
"educational records. '77
It is clear where the Ohio Supreme Court found support for its position that
disciplinary board records are not educational records-it discussed The Red &
Black extensively.78 How the Georgia Supreme Court conjured up such an
interpretation is less clear.79 It is evident that both courts appeal to a policy
rationale-the protection of students and opening of governmental functions to
public scrutiny 80-while courageously flaunting the plain language of Buckley.
How the United States Supreme Court views such a drastic departure from the
75 The Miami Student, 680 N.E.2d at 959.
7 6 Again, Buckley defines "educational records" only as those records that "contain
information directly related to a student" that are "maintained by an educational agency or
institution." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (1994).
77 See, e.g., Daggett, supra note 14, at 624-28 (explaining the breadth of the definition for
"educational records"); Mawdsley, supra note 17 (detailing the treatment of Buckley in
general, and educational records in particular, in various court cases).
7 8 See The Miami Student, 680 N.E.2d at 958.
79 In 1996, Assistant Secretary of Education David Longanecker wrote a "Dear
Colleague" letter to advise schools that Buckley was not intended to cover statistical
information. See Letter from United States Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary
Education, to Colleges and Universities Generally (May 1996) <http://wvw.campussafety.org/
CSA/colleague.html>. The effect of this letter, according to recent studies, has been negligible.
See General Accounting Office, Campus Crime: Difficulties Meeting Federal Reporting
Requirements (Mar. 11, 1997) <http://www.campussafety.org/STUDIES/gao.htrd>.
80 The Ohio Supreme Court explained, "For potential students, and their parents, it is
imperative that they are made aware of all campus crime statistics and other types of
misconduct in order to make an intelligent decision of which university to attend." The Miami
Student, 680 N.E.2d at 959. The Georgia Supreme Court explained, "We are mindful that
openness in sensitive proceedings is sometimes unpleasant, difficult, and occasionally harmful.
Nevertheless, the policy of this state is that the public's business must be open, not only to
protect against potential abuse, but also to maintain the public's confidence in its officials."
Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Board of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 263 (Ga. 1993).
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language of Buckley is not entirely certain: in December 1997, the Court
declined to decide the issue when it refused to hear Miami University's case. 81
Just one month after the Supreme Court denied certiorari, however, in a
surprising turn of events, 82 the United States Department of Education (DOE)
brought suit against Miami to prevent it from releasing student disciplinary
records.83 According to a spokesperson for the DOE, the suit was a response to
the University's release of disciplinary records with only the students' social
security numbers deleted.8 4 A district court judge granted the DOE's request for
an injunction, explaining that "it is abundantly clear that the disciplinary records
that are the subject of the instant case satisfy both prongs of the statutory
definition of educational records. '85 Thus, Miami University, while waiting for a
81 See Miami Univ. v. Miami Student, 118 S. Ct. 616 (1997).
82 See supra note 79. Note, however, that the Department of Education was clear in
expressing its position that student disciplinary records come within the broad definition of
"educational records" in a subsequent letter to Miami University. See Letter from United States
Department of Education, LeRoy S. Rooker, Director, Family Policy Compliance Office, to
James Garland, President, Miami University (Aug. 7, 1997) <http://www.campussafety.org/
COURTS/MUOHIdoe.html>.
83 The DOE filed suit on January 22, 1998, in the District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, seeking an injunction against both Miami University and The Ohio State University
and asking the court to define "educational records." See United States v. Miami Univ., No. C-
2-98-0097 (S.D. Ohio filed Jan. 22, 1998). In its complaint, the United States charges that,
"Defendants have violated [the duty to keep student educational records confidential] in the
past and intend to continue to violate this duty in the future by publicly releasing student
disciplinary records that contain personally identifiable information without the prior consent
of the students or their parents." Id. See generally Ben L. Kaufman, U.S. Challenges Miami
Discipline Records Release, CINCINNATI ENQuIRER, Jan. 24, 1998, at B8.
84 See Kaufimn, supra note 83, at B8. According to officials at Miami University, the
school was deluged with requests for information in the wake of the Ohio Supreme Court
decision, most notably from the Chronicle of Higher Education, a national publication. See
Amy Beth Graves, Two Colleges Are Barred From Releasing Disciplinary Records, THE
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 14, 1998, at B5; Robert Ruth, Court Blocks Release of Student Records,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 14, 1998, at C3. One must wonder, in light of the careful ruling
made by the Ohio Supreme Court as to what may and may not be released as part of a student's
disciplinary record, why Miami chose to delete only the students' social security numbers
before releasing the information. Given such an egregious departure from the mandates of the
Ohio Supreme Court, it is possible that the DOE felt it had to intervene in the matter-to settle
once and for all the definition of "educational records."
85 United States v. Miami Univ., No. C-2-98-0097 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 1998). The "two-
prong test" to which the district court judge referred is likely derived from the statutory
definition of "educational records." Unlike the Ohio and Georgia Supreme Courts, the district
court judge did not read in any requirement that the records be related to a student's financial
status or academic record. Rather, the judge explained that, "the Court notes that nothing in the
statutory scheme suggests that 'information directly relating to a student' pertains only to
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definitive answer from the court, stood in the middle of a significant war over
statutory interpretation.
With no U.S. Supreme Court opinion on the matter and in light of the DOE's
troubling decision to construe "educational records" so broadly, lower courts are
left to grapple with the issue for themselves. 86 Obviously, this does not bode well
for those who advocate an across-the-board policy of disclosure of disciplinary
board reports. If Buckley is to remain in its present form, judicial construction
may be the only hope for those who seek the information buried in secret
disciplinary boards;87 yet the suit brought by the DOE may do much to
undermine such attempts.88 It is doubtful that universities will come to a similar
understanding on their own.
III. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM: BENEFITS OF CONCEALMENT
Universities will not likely understand Buckley as allowing the disclosure of
disciplinary records for one simple reason: schools benefit more from concealing
information than they do from releasing it. There are at least three reasons for
this. First, shrouding information on campus crime in disciplinary boards
effectively makes those crimes disappear for purposes of the Campus Security
Act,89 a federal law that otherwise mandates disclosure of campus crime
statistics. Second, by burying information within university disciplinary boards,
schools are able to deny awareness of crime on campus. By denying the
existence of crime, schools may be able to insulate themselves from tort liability.
Third, by avoiding disclosure of potentially protected information, schools avoid
the risk of violating the mandates of Buckley and, thereby, losing millions of
academic performance, as the court in The Miami Student seemed to infer."Id at 4.
86 Only the Ohio and Georgia Supreme Courts have decided this exact issue so far.
87 lmportantly, schools that are compelled to release information by judicial decree will
not be subjected to the withdrawal of federal funding otherwise mandated by Buckley. See 20
U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) ("No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to
any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of releasing... any
personally identifiable information in education records ... unless... such information is
furnished in compliance with judicial order... "). Thus, judicial construction may be
imperative to the release of disciplinary records in the future.
8 8 One must be careful, however, in assuming that this suit necessarily means that the
DOE is committed to a policy of non-disclosure of disciplinary records. While that does appear
to be the case, it may also be true that the suit was btought in response to Miami's having
released the reports with only the students' social security numbers deleted. In the latter case,
the DOE may not be so opposed to the way the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted "educational
records," as it is to the way Miami carried out the court's order.
89 See Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-542,
104 Stat. 2381 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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dollars in federal aid.
A. Concealment and Better Cime Statistics
The 1990 Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act (CSA)90
requires all institutions of higher education that participate in federal funding
programs to "prepare, publish and distribute... to all current students and
employees... an annual security report."91 At a minimum, the CSA requires a
school to provide information on six categories of offenses92 for the three
preceding calendar years,93 along with statements of policy on both law
enforcement and the reporting of campus crimes. 94 Though the CSA was not
specifically enacted for the purpose of closing the loopholes contained in
Buckley,95 Buckley has been amended to allow for the reporting of the
information required by the CSA.96 The goal has beenfull disclosure of accurate
information.
While the intention of lawmakers may have been full disclosure, the result
has been anything but:97 image-conscious administrators have now found
90 104 Stat. 2381.
91 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
921Tese six categories are: murder, sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
and motor vehicle theft. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F).
93 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F) ("[s]tatistics concerning the occurrence on campus,
during the most recent calendar year, and during the 2 preceding calendar years for which data
are available").
94 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(A), (C).
95 Rather, the CSA was enacted "(A) to encourage the development on all campuses of
security policies and procedures; (B) for uniformity and consistency in the reporting of crimes
on campus; and (C) to encourage the development of policies and procedures to address sexual
assaults and racial violence on college campuses." Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-542, Title II, § 202, 104 Stat. 2384. The CSA has been applauded as
a "consumer protection bill for students." 136 CONG. REC. 12,617 (1990) (remarks of
Representative Coleman).
9 6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an
institution ... from disclosing, to an alleged victim of any crime of violence.., the results of
any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such institution against the alleged perpetrator of
such crime with respect to such crime."); see also Daggett, supra note 14, at 620-21 ("A single
provision of [the CSA] modified Buckley to permit higher education schools to disclose the
oitcome of school disciplinary proceedings to victims of crimes of violence.") (emphasis
added). Congress has then, to some extent, attempted to coordinate the functioning of Buckley
and the CSA.
97 See, e.g., Bonnie Fisher & Dr. Chunmeng Lu, The Extent and Pattern of Compliance
with the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990. A National Study (Aug. 1996)
<http'//www.campussafety.org/STUDIES/fisher.html>.
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dubious ways of evading full disclosure by channeling campus crimes into
disciplinary boards.98 According to Benjamin F. Clery, the current president of a
non-profit campus security organization, Security on Campus, Inc.:
Typically, the annual crime report is compiled by the Campus Security
Department based on incidents handled directly by campus police. What many
schools exclude is the spectrum of student-on-student crime that is reported to
[housing officials, rape crisis centers, counselors, and deans]. By the time a
felony or misdemeanor crime is channeled into the disciplinary committee, it
becomes a "violation of the student code of conduce' and school administrators
claim the crime is "confidential" under [Buckley]. 99
By channeling these incidents of criminal activity to disciplinary boards,100
and then classifying them as mere violations of the student code, universities are
able to maintain the illusion of safe and crime-free schools. Buckley thus
provides a convenient loophole for side-stepping the reporting requirements of
the CSA. 101
As long as both the CSA and Buckley continue to exist in their present
forms, the impulse for school officials to seek ways to manipulate crime statistics
will also persist. The fact is, universities, like many other businesses, need to be
marketable; glossing over alarming rates of crime is one step toward achieving
superior marketability. Because concealifng crimes benefits the university in such
an important way, there is little incentive to disclose disciplinary reports.
Moreover, this incentive is reinforced by the enforcement provisions of the CSA
which, when compared with those for Buckley, are equally weakl 02
98 See Hearing on Campus Crime & the Accuracy in Campus Crime Reportng Act of
1997: Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education, Training and Life-long Learning of
the House Comm. on Education and the Workforce Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter
Hearing] (testimony of Benjamin F. Clery).
99 Hearing, supra note 98.
100 The Miami University example, discussed supra Part I, is a poignant example of this
trend.
101 Note that the CSA and Buckley, while not intended to conflict with one another, are
manipulated by school officials in such a way as to create a contradiction in terms: the CSA
mandates disclosure, while Buckley, because of the disciplinary records loophole that schools
have found, mandates confidentiality.
102 The operative provision of the CSA makes continued federal funding contingent on a
school's compliance with the CSA's reporting requirements. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)
(1994). However, as with Buckley, no school has ever lost funding due to inadequate reporting.
See Michael C. Griffaton, Forewarned is Forearmed: The Crime Awareness and Campus
Security Act of 1990 and the Future of Institutional Liability for Student Victimization, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 525, 585 (1993). Also, like Buckley, the CSA does not provide for
private enforcement actions; only the Secretary of Education can punish a non-compliant
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B. Concealment and the Avoidance ofLiability: Ignorance is Bliss
While modem courts do not look upon the university as the insurer of the
safety of its students, it is nevertheless true that courts continue to hold
universities liable in certain circumstances for the crimes that befall students. As
with any tort, in order to prove a university liable, a student must prove the
following four elements: (1) the school had a duty; (2) the duty was breached; (3)
the student was injured; and (4) the school's breach of duty was the proximate
cause of the student's injury.103 Today, at least three theories of duty continue to
hold sway in modem courts: a duty to be forthcoming about risks, a duty to warn
about risks, and a duty to provide adequate protection.104
The duty to warn about risks assumes a "special relationship" between
university and student such that the former is legally obligated to inform the
latter as to foreseeable danger.105 While campus crimes reported to campus law
enforcement agencies may satisfy the requirement of foreseeability, channeling
other crimes into disciplinary hearings puts the school officials in a position to
argue that more serious offenses were not foreseeable-particularly in the case
where serious assault charges have been classified only as "violations of the
student code of conduct."106
Similarly, the duty to provide adequate security makes it incumbent on
school officials to take certain precautions to deal with known dangers. 107 If a
university has notice of criminal activities, either through specific complaints or
because of statistics, a failure to provide adequate security to protect its students
becomes actionable in tort. Again, the emphasis is on foreseeable criminal
activity.'08
With all of the emphasis that is put on foreseeable crime, it is hardly
surprising that universities have an incentive to turn a blind eye to the student
crime occurring on campuses. Channeling those crimes into disciplinary boards
school by withholding funds. See id. at 586; see also infra Part mH.C.
103 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 539 (explaining the requirements for establishing a
prima facie case of civil liability against a college).
104 See id. at 539-40.
105 See id. at 542.
106 At Carlton College in Northfield, Minnesota, a student accused of numerous sexual
assaults was ultimately punished by the school's disciplinary board for "advancement without
sanction," and at the University of Pennsylvania, rape is classified only as a "personal crime!'
See Kyle E. Niederpruem, Families Lead the Way in Seeking Access to Campus Police Logs,
THE QumL, Jun. 1, 1996, at 69, 70.
107 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 542-43 (discussing in full the duty to provide
adequate security).
108 See id.
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allows for the kind of willful ignorance that may shield the university from
liability. According to Dr. Chunmeng Lu and Professor Bonnie Fisher, authors of
a 1994 University of Cincinnati study on compliance with CSA reporting
requirements, "the benefits [of not disclosing] ... are greater than the costs of
legal compliance due to administrators' perception that their liability exposure
increases as they create a 'standard of care."' 10 9 Accurate crime statistics that
indicate a problem with crime on a particular campus put the onus on school
officials to address the problem or risk being held liable for foreseeable crimes.
The easier course of action would seem to be to "resist accountability."' 10
The duty to be forthcoming, unlike the previously discussed duties, may
mitigate in favor of accurate reporting, but liability under this duty may be
avoided as well if school officials maintain a sufficient amount of ignorance as to
crime on campus. The duty to be forthcoming essentially requires universities to
be honest in their representations of the nature and extent of campus crime.111
Thus, a school may be held, liable for failing to disclose the reality of crime on its
campus or for purposely misrepresenting the security of the campus in college
brochures.1 12 By this theory, even officials who purposely keep themselves
ignorant as to conditions on the campus may be held liable. However, it is again
the level of ignorance or accountability that is all important in attaching
liability. 13 School officials still have an incentive under this duty, as well as
with the other two, to divert cases of criminal misconduct into clandestine
disciplinary hearings before they become aware of the circumstances
surrounding the misconduct; in this way, they may "legitimately" disavow
knowledge of campus crime.
C. Concealment and Continued Funding
A third important benefit that schools enjoy as a result of concealing vital
information on campus crime is continued federal funding. As explained above,
Bucldey's only enforcement mechanism lies in its conditioning of federal funds
on compliance with confidentiality requirements; 1 4 the incentive for schools to
109 See Hearing, supra note 98 (referring to the findings of Dr. Chunmeng Lu and
Professor Bonnie Fisher).
110 See id.
111 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 540-42 (discussing the duty to be forthcoming and
how it has been interpreted in recent court cases).
112 See David Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From Shield to Sword?, 12 J.C.
& U.L. 201, 202 (1985) (arguing that college brochures are really advertisements, and thus
carry with them the penalties for false advertisement, breach of contract, and the like).
113 See Hearing, supra note 98.
114 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1994) ("No funds shall be made available ... to any
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err on the side of concealment is thus very great. In 1998 alone, close to fifty-
eight billion dollars was budgeted by the federal government to support higher
education.11 5 A great amount of money is at stake.
The Miami Student again provides a compelling example. 116 After arguing
the school's case to the Ohio Supreme Court, but before that court handed down
its ruling, Gerald Draper, a Columbus lawyer representing the University,
explained that the school stood to lose forty-million dollars in federal aid.117 The
amount of money Miami stood to lose helps explain why, in the period between
1994-1996, various types of campus crime were under-reported. 118 According to
a DOE investigation into Miami's reporting methods, one of several deficiencies
in the school's reports included the omission of crime statistics compiled by the
office of Judicial Affairs-the office that oversees the operation of the University
Disciplinary Board.119 Underrepresentation of crimes also occurred as a result of
Miami's not recognizing fraternity houses as part of the school's campus. 120
Buckley was used by the University to dodge the requirements of the CSA,
thereby protecting its forty-million dollars in federal aid.
While it is true that universities see the threat of withdrawn federal aid as
serious enough to merit concealment, it is also true that the DOE has never
exercised its authority in this regard. 121 Not once since the enactment of Buckley
has a college or university lost federal funding due to a violation.122 Part of the
problem stems from the fact that Buckley itself does not mandate disclosure; it
instead induces schools to keep educational records confidential. The CSA
attempts to compel disclosure, 123 but its enforcement mechanisms are equally
educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein... ) of students
without the written consent of their parents. . .
115 See Heaing, supra note 98, at 3.
116 See The Miami Student v. Miami Univ., 680 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1997).
117 See DAYTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 13, at B4.
1 18 See id.
119See Letter from U.S. Department of Education, Student Financial Assistance
Programs, to Dr. James Garland, President Miami University 5 (Sept. 11, 1997) [hereinafter
DOE Letter].
12 0 See id. at 6-7. According to the DOE investigation, a total of 66 burglaries, 28 liquor
law arrests, 3 drug law arrests, 2 sexual assaults, and 13 aggravated assaults were not reported
for the years 1994-1996 because the University failed to include fraternity houses in the
definition of the school's "campus."
121 See Daggett, supra note 14, at 618.
122 See id.
123 Again, the CSA and Buckley are not in direct conflict by their own terms: the CSA
attempts to compel disclosure of materials that are, in theory at least, not supposed to be
protected by Buckley. The CSA deals with statistics on crime and law enforcement policy, a
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deficient: a violation of the CSA is supposed to result in suspension of federal
funds, 124 but no school has yet suffered such a penalty. 125 While the Secretary of
the Department of Education is vested with exclusive enforcement authority, of
both Buckley and the CSA, not a single line item in the 1998 budget for higher
education was included for enforcement of reporting requirements.
126
Nevertheless, it is the mere potential of losing millions of dollars in federal
aid that induces schools to conceal disciplinary information.1 27 Because there are
virtually no consequences for failing to report under the CSA, it becomes very
easy for schools to fall back on Buckley and do nothing; particularly when doing
nothing avoids the chance of withdrawn funding. Furthermore, withholding
information can be rationalized by other benefits as well: the potential avoidance
of tort liability and the opportunity to advertise a safer campus. Combined with
the threat of suspension of federal funding and the vagueness surrounding the
term "educational records," these benefits all argue in favor of concealing
information. The incentive structure that Congress has set up clearly favors
continued concealment. Thus, educational institutions, wise to these incentives,
opportunistically invoke Buckley to their benefit.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In order to address the disciplinary board concealment problem,
Representative John Duncan (Republican-Tennessee) introduced legislation in
the U.S. House of Representatives in February of 1997.128 Entitled "The
separate area from that of confidential educational records. It is only through universities'
interpretation of disciplinary records as educational records that we have arrived at this
apparent conflict in the two pieces of legislation.
124 See 20 U.S.C. § 1094(c)(1)(F) (1994).
125 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 586. Miami University, after having been found in
violation of the CSA, was subject to only the mildest of sanctions that could not be considered
a penalty. According to the investigators assigned to the case:
The institution is required to review its disciplinary notification procedures to ensure that
all policy statements, as well as actual enforcement, are in compliance ... In its current
response, the institution must indicate additions/modifications to its current policy as well
as how it will implement the required policies and procedures.
DOE letter, supra note 119, at 9.
126 See Hearing, supra note 98, at 3.
127 See Jane Kirtley, Shedding Light on Campus Crime, 19 AM. JOURNALISM REV. 50
(1997) (explaining that since the enactment of Buckley, schools have invoked it to justify the
sealing of any record that identifies a student).
128 See 143 CONG. REC. H522 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1997) (introduction of H.R. 715 by
Representative Duncan).
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Accuracy in Campus Crime Reporting Act," H.R. 715 sought to "close some of
the loopholes that have allowed many colleges and universities to not report
many instances of criminal activity on their campuses."'129 Specifically, the bill
"will... change Federal educational privacy laws that have shielded students
who have been charged with criminal acts because of a definition that considers
such charges as part of [a] ... student's private academic record." 130
The improvements that H.R. 715 sought were ambitious. The legislation
attempted not only to coerce accurate reporting, but also to reconcile the
competing goals of Buckley and the CSA. In particular, the bill: (1) required
disciplinary officers, housing officials, counselors, deans, athletic department
officials, and administrators to report criminal offenses to the university; 131 (2)
directed the Secretary of Education to report each school's statistics to certain
congressional committees, to each institution, and to the public via printed and
electronic means;132 (3) required campus law enforcement agencies to maintain
publicly-available log books detailing reported crimes, including the names of
those charged in the offense, the date, the time, and the location of the offense,
and the disposition of the offense;133 (4) directed university disciplinary boards
to open their records for public inspection;134 and (5) established a penalty
scheme whereby institutions found in noncompliance would have at least one
percent of federal assistance suspended for each count of non-compliance.1 35
12 9 Id. at E230.
130 Id. at E230.
131 See H.R. 715, 105th Cong. (1997) ("[The CSA] is amended... by striking 'campus
security authorities or local police agencies' and inserting 'campus security or law
enforcement; other campus officials (including administrators, deans, disciplinary officers,
athletic department officials, housing officials, and counselors) to whom crimes are reported; or
local law enforcement."). This provision thus amends the CSA to provide for the publishing of
statistics on crimes reported not just to campus police or local police, but to all the other
enumerated officials.
132 See id. ("The Secretary shall collect such statistics and report each set in its entirety,
with each institution and campus clearly identified, to the Committee on Education and the
Workforce .... the Committee on Labor and Human Resources..., each participating
institution, and the public via printed and electronic means as the Secretary shall determine.').
133 See id. ("Each institution participating in any program under this title which maintains
either a police log or security department of any kind shall make, keep, and maintain a daily
log, written in a form that can be easily understood, recording in chronological order all crimes
reported to such police or security department....').
134 See id ("[A]ll records of any such campus disciplinary proceeding brought alleging
criminal misconduct shall be open to public inspection during the regular business hours of the
custodian of such records ... .).
135 See id ("For each separate count of noncompliance found, the Secretary shall suspend
not less than 1 percent of the financial assistance provided by the Department to such
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The potential of the Accuracy in Campus Crime Reporting Act's attempts to
open up disciplinary board records was, in and of itself, very ambitious. More
than simply requiring such boards to release materials to those who request them,
the bill would actually have required that disciplinary boards: (1) prepare and
distribute a statement of policy regarding disciplinary practices in cases of
alleged violations of both the student code of conduct and federal, state, or local
laws and how those violations are handled; 136 (2) notify students reporting
crimes to disciplinary boards of their right to also notify proper law
enforcement;1 37 (3) notify students involved in disciplinary board hearings of
their right to have others present at the hearing;138 (4) notify both the accuser and
the accused of the outcome of any disciplinary hearing;139 and (5) open all
disciplinary records involving criminal misconduct to public inspection during
regular business hours.140 Summarily, the boards would have been affirmatively
required to disseminate information on their policies and practices. In addition,
the bill would have made clear that reports containing information on students'
criminal offenses are not educational records within the meaning of Buckley-
institution."). While this may not seem like a significant amount, consider again Miami
University: if forty-million dollars in federal aid is given to the University in one year, just one
count of noncompliance would cost the school $400,000.
136 See id.:
Each institution of higher education participating in any program under this title shall
develop and distribute... a statement of policy regarding... such institution's on-
campus disciplinary practices in cases of alleged infractions of the institution's code of
conduct, or other policies, resulting from an act or series of acts that would constitute a
crime or crimes within the meaning of local, State, or Federal law, whether or not those
acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction; and... the
procedures followed once a crime has occurred.
Id. This sweeping change, in and of itself, would have done much to eradicate the loophole
presently found in Buckley: schools would no longer be able to classify offenses as mere
violations of the student code of conduct and dodge the reporting requirements of the CSA-
instead they would be required to look to local, state, and federal law for classification.
13 7 See id. ("[A]l1 students reporting an offense shall be informed of their options to notify
proper law enforcement, including on-campus and local police... ).
13 8 See id. ("lT'he accuser and the accused are entitled to the same opportunities to have
others present during a campus disciplinary proceeding. .. ').
13 9 See i d ("[B]oth the accuser and the accused shall be informed of the outcome of any
campus disciplinary proceeding brought alleging criminal misconduct. ..
14 0 See id. ("[Al records of any such campus disciplinary proceeding brought alleging
criminal misconduct shall be open to public inspection during regular business hours of the
custodian of such records .... ").
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no matter who the custodian is.141
H.R. 715 enjoyed the support of many in the House of Representatives who
would like to see an end to the status quo.142 Sixty-five House members joined
on as cosponsors of the legislation within nine months of its introduction.143 Yet
the future of this key piece of legislation is unclear. As of this date, the bill
remains in the Subconmnittee on Postsecondary Education, Training, and Life-
long Learning (after being referred from the House Committee on Education and
the Workforce), where hearings were held on July 17, 1997.144
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As has already been mentioned, H.R. 715 sought significant changes in the
area of campus crime reporting. Regardless of whether or not the legislation is
passed, at least some of the problems involved with securing accurate and
thorough crime statistics will persist. This persistence is due to H.R. 715's failure
to include off-campus areas in mandatory crime reports, its failure to adequately
remove incentives for school administrators to conceal information, and its
failure to provide for private enforcement.
A. Inclusion of Off-Campus Areas
While H.R. 715 takes significant steps to ensure that accurate and thorough
information is released on campus crimes, the bill fails to address the multitude
of crimes that occur just off university campuses. In fact, off-campus crime
statistics play as great a role as on-campus statistics in the decisionmaking
process of selecting a college. It is difficult to imagine that a college can
accurately portray the safety of a campus without reference to overall student
security, both on- and off-campus. 145
When the CSA was originally proposed in the U.S. Senate, it contained a
141 See id (inserting language into Buckley that includes disciplinary records in the list of
things that are not "educational records"). While Buckley currently makes it clear that a law
enforcement agency's records are not "educational records," this bill will expand that definition
to include disciplinary boards.
142 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC., supra note 128, at E230.
143 See id. at E230.
144 See Hearing, supra note 98. This piece of legislation, due to subsequent events in
Congress, will likely not be voted on. On October 7, 1998, Congress passed the Higher
Education Amendments of 1998 and, in doing so, amended Buckley in a way that makes clear,
once and for all, that disciplinary records are not educational records. See infra part VI.
145 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 571.
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provision, to deal with off-campus student crime.146 The House of
Representatives, however, did not adopt this version of the bill. According to the
CSA's sponsor, Representative Goodling, the Senate version was rejected
because:
Considering the fact that our goal is to provide students with information on
crimes on their campus, the inclusion of all information on crimes against
students would have skewed the data reported to students in such a manner that
they would never know if their school's security system was effective in
protecting students. 14
7
Thus, the CSA was ultimately passed without the provision dealing with off-
campus crime.
An understanding of "campus crime" as dealing only with those crimes that
occur immediately on campus and not those that occur just off-campus is,
however, extremely myopic. 148 No doubt the majority of students attending
college, in the course of their education, spend a great deal of time off-
campus.149 Plus, few universities are able to offer campus housing for all
students. 150 Apprising students of dangers lurking just off-campus and requiring
disciplinary boards to reveal information on those crimes, is necessary to
adequately inform the student body.151
14 6 See infra note 149.
147 136 CONG. REC. H1l,499-500 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (remarks of Representative
Goodling); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-518, at 9 (1990) ('The committee does not intend that
crimes committed on major, public thoroughfares which are not under the control of the
institution or the campus security authorities be included in statistics required to be reported by
this Act.").
148 Indeed, when one considers where the most troubling crimes occur, it is not in
academic buildings. While it is true that college campuses suffer their fair share of vandalism
and property crimes and that significant numbers of violent crimes occur in student
dormitories, the average student is significantly more concerned with personal crimes such as
assault and rape-particularly those that threaten their safety while away from the campus's
safe environs.
149 In Ohio, for example, 99% of students attending Cleveland State University, 98%
attending Youngstown State University, 81% of those attending The Ohio State University,
and 92% attending the University of Toledo live off-campus. See Griffaton, supra note 102, at
572 n.294 (summarizing BARRON'S PROFILE OF ANMERICAN COLLEGES 1228-43 (17th ed.
1990)).
150 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 572 (quoting Senator Specter).
151 See id. at 571-72:
[I]t is difficult to imagine that a college can describe realistically its campus safety without
reference to overall student safety, whether on-campus or off. Since it is probable that
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Taking the Miami example,152 it is clear that students need to be cautioned
as to the dangers that exist just yards away from their classrooms. In the Miami
illustration, the off-campus rape occurred not even a mile away from most
dormitories. 153 The administration at Miami would be hard pressed to argue that
crimes such as the one perpetrated against its first-year student are not relevant
and worthy of disclosure. Surely the victim sees it differently. And under the
current system, the thousands of women currently enrolled at Miami remain
ignorant to this violent assault and others like it. Legislation that takes off-
campus crime into account would make crimes like the one at Miami,
perpetrated by an off-campus student, known to college communities.
The notion expressed by Representative Goodling that including off-campus
statistics in annual crime reports "skews" those reports is inaccurate and, indeed,
circular. If the goal is informing students as to the statistical likelihood of crimes
occurring during their tenure at a university, then surely off-campus offenses are
relevant; relevant offenses will not skew a report. Furthermore, any potential
problem could be solved by allocating a separate section of the report to those
crimes that occurred off-campus. 154 A uniform definition of "off-campus" could
also be promulgated, e.g., a five-mile radius from the center of campus. 155 Only
by reporting the full panoply of crimes that a student faces while at school can
schools adequately convey the level of safety the student will encounter. To
allow disciplinary boards to conceal off-campus crime information is to
dangerously misrepresent the college environment. If the goal of the reporting
requirements is to fully inform students of risks, then any corrective legislation
must address off-campus crime as well.
B. Eradicating Incentives to Conceal
The reporting schemes currently in place provide several incentives to
many students will live, or at least venture, off-campus at some point in their college
careers, informing students of the crime risks present in the enveloping community is
necessary.
Id.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
153 See supra note 2.
154 Michael Griffaton argues for this same off-campus reporting. See Griffaton, supra
note 102, at 574 ('To prevent skewed data, off-campus crime statistics can be recorded in a
separate category labeled, for example, 'off-campus student victimization as compiled through
voluntary student disclosure.").
155 Obviously this might pose a problem when comparing a small, rural college to a
larger, urban one. Thus, an alternative could be individualized definitions of "off-campus"
depending on the character of the school.
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conceal disciplinary reports.156 While H.R. 715 would have addressed the basic
flaw in Buckley-the classification of disciplinary reports as educational
records-the legislation fails to remove the strong incentives that compel a
university to channel information to a disciplinary board in the first place: that is,
the benefit of better crime statistics, avoidance of tort liability, and continued
federal funding. While no regulatory scheme could eradicate all three benefits
entirely, there are still steps that could be made in this regard.
1. Uniform Enforcement
First, any legislation proposing to deal with Buckley and the CSA must be
universally enforced. That is, enforcement must be such that all schools are dealt
with consistently and in the same manner. Miami University, for example, would
be reluctant to come forward with its crime statistics if there is evidence that
several competitor schools have manipulated their own data. It must be "safe" for
universities to disclose fully. Thus, the Secretary of Education must be diligent in
efforts to sanction those schools that do not fully and honestly comply. Perhaps
no amount of diligence can fully ensure that image-conscious administrators will
feel comfortable reporting on the safety hazards of their own campuses, but at
least with a level playing field there is more incentive than not to comply.
2. A Chance to Explain
In addition, legislation should include a requirement that universities explain
their statistics in their reports. 157 Because students and the public could likely
misinterpret an initially high crime rate as indicative of lax security measures (as
opposed to an increase in reporting of crimes), a school's explanation could do
much to mitigate the otherwise harsh reporting requirements. Studies indicate
that the number of students attending a college, the number of commuters at a
school, the nature of the campus environment (i.e., rural versus urban), and the
number of male students on a campus all influence the crime rate; 158 giving
schools the opportunity to explain this could make the difference between
compliance and continued concealment.
156 See supra Part 1.
157 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 578 (arguing for an amendment to the CSA that
would require schools to explain what their statistics signify in order to combat the confusion
surrounding raw data).
158 See id. (listing factors to be taken into account when analyzing statistical data from
colleges and universities).
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3. Dealing with Tort Liability
Moreover, any corrective legislation must address the issue of tort liability.
As was explained earlier, universities face liability for those foreseeable acts of
which the school is aware; 159 thus, legislation that forces schools to take into
account more criminal activities is likely to be resisted. The answer, then, lies in
educating administrators: it must be understood that while recognizing crime
increases the potential for liability, taking adequate steps to deal with known
safety risks lowers that potential. 160 Similarly, administrators must understand
that schools are not liable for the crimes that occur off-campus. 16 1
In addition, pressure could be applied to schools to fortify efforts in campus
law enforcement generally in order to lessen the school's exposure to tort
liability that may come as a result of increased recognition of crimes. Funding
could be offered for the creation of voluntary student-staffed patrols or for the
implementation of safety awareness seminars. Schools could also make
concerted efforts to encourage student-victims to pursue remedies against
offenders: requiring such information to be provided to victims offers the twin
benefits of ensuring that colleges cannot conceal information and decreasing the
likelihood that the school is sued for misrepresentation. 162
4. Closing the Loopholes
Finally, any effort to close the significant loophole contained in Buckley
must make non-compliance more expensive than disclosure. Unless a clear
statement is made that disciplinary reports are definitely not educational records
covered by Buckley, schools will always err on the side of concealment: the
transaction costs of disclosing under the current system are otherwise too great.
Because Buckley mandates that educational records be kept confidential and
threatens the withdrawal of funding only if schools improperly disclose
information (or deny information to parents), a corresponding piece of legislation
must make the following clear: (1) disciplinary reports are not educational
159 See id. at 578-79.
160 While the area surrounding tort liability for foreseeable crimes is quite complex, it is
generally true that in order for plaintiffs to prevail, they must prove that the university had prior
notice of the assaults on campus and failed to take sufficient corrective measures. See, e.g.,
Miller v. New York, 467 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1984) (holding university liable for failing to take
even minimal security precautions after receiving complaints); see also Griffaton, supra note
102, at 578-83 (discussing tort liability for foreseeable campus crimes).
161 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 573 ("[Ojolleges and universities are neither liable
nor responsible for off-campus crimes committed against their students.').
162 See id. at 583.
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records, and (2) disciplinary reports must be disclosed. Only legislation that
serves this goal will effectively reconcile the contrasting goals, as they have been
interpreted, of the CSA and Buckley. Additionally, Congress must ensure that
part of the budget for higher education is allocated for enforcement of this new
legislation.
C. Providing for Private Enforcement and Remedies
As explained above, Buckley currently provides for no private enforcement
and courts have consistently refused to allow for private causes of action.163
Thus, under the current system the onus is on the Secretary of the Department of
Education to ferret out instances of non-compliance with both Buckley and the
CSA and to sanction violator-schools accordingly. It is no wonder that under the
current system much non-compliance falls through the cracks, enabling schools
to perpetuate this conspiracy of silence. Even under H.R. 715, this Secretary-
driven model would persist.164
On the other hand, a system that offers those with the strongest interest in
securing the release of vital crime reports--students and their families-the
opportunity to compel disclosure would make for an altogether more responsive
and accountable system. 165 Students, concerned for their own personal safety
and empowered by an improved Buckley, could easily bring suit to coerce
disclosure. Universities, keenly aware of the potential of a proliferation of
lawsuits, would make accurate and full reporting a top priority. In this way, the
incentive structure will have changed.
163 See supra note 50. Courts have denied private remedies for those damaged by the
release of information as well as for those damaged by a failure to release information. In
either case, the only recognized remedy available to the aggrieved party is § 1983-for state
violations of individual civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
164 See H.R. 715, 105th Cong. (1997) ("If any participating institution of higher
education fails or refuses to comply with any provision of this subsection, the Secretary shall
forthwith terminate all assistance to the institution ....").
165 Michael Griffaton, in arguing for private enforcement of the CSA, analogizes a
student-driven system to neighborhood crime watch groups. In his view, a student-driven
system will encourage students to vigilantly police their own campuses, educate others about
the importance of their interests, and will induce colleges and universities to comply with the
reporting requirements. See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 587-88. Neighborhood watch
programs generally have resulted in citizens taking an active role in policing their
neighborhoods and a concomitant reduction in overall crime. See Douglas I. Brandon et al.,
Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society,
37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 894-95 (1984) ("Recent evaluations of the effectiveness of these
programs are encouraging. One study strongly suggested that neighborhood watch programs
appreciably deter criminal activity").
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Take again The Miami Student. Had a system of private enforcement been in
place, the editor of The Miami Student could have compelled Miami to release
the requested information with relative ease, and a lengthy court battle over the
meaning of "educational records" could have been avoided. Similarly, Miami
students acting on their own behalf might have secured the release of disciplinary
records relating to student rapes earlier, prompting students like Erin R. to be
more cautious in the first instance.
It is important to note that under a student-driven system, however, adequate
penalties must attach for withholding information. These could range from
injunctions and heavy fines, to attorney's fees and costs. 166 Imposing such
monetary sanctions would fulfill the twin objectives of both providing students
with the incentive to comply and deterring universities from concealing
information. Again, this would bring about a much needed change in the existing
incentive structure: universities would find that, with active outside policing by
students, they would no longer be able to collectively subvert the purposes of the
CSA. 16 7
VI. CONCLUSION
On October 7, 1998, Congress passed the Higher Education Amendments of
1998168 and effectively accomplished much of what this Note argues for. In
particular, one part of the Higher Education Amendments, the Jeanne Clery
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act,t 69
requires universities to collect statistics on crime and distribute them annually to
all students and employees, 170 and, more importantly, requires those statistics to
be collected for crimes that occur on campus, 171 on noncampus buildings or
property, 172 and on public property.173 Even more significantly, this latest
166 See Griffaton, supra note 102, at 586-87.
167 Indeed, part of the current problem is that schools' efforts at concealing information
are mutually reinforcing: the status quo is concealment, and "everybody is doing it." Buckley
has allowed for this self-protectionist behavior on the part of universities by providing for such
lax policing.
168 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (1998). For a detailed legislative history, see Campus Security
Legislation (visited Feb. 24 1999) <http'//www.soconline.orgLEGIS/105>.
169 This Act was named for Jeanne Clery, a college student murdered on the campus of
Lehigh University in April, 1986. See Floor Statement of Senator Jim M. Jeffords, July 9, 1998
<http'//www.soconline.org/LEGIS/105/effordsl.html>.
170 See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f).
171 See id § 1092(f)(1)(F).
172 See id. § 1092(f)(1)(F) "Noncampus building or property" means "any building or
property owned or controlled by a student organization recognized by the institution," and "any
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legislation amends Buckley to make clear that nothing in Buckley prohibits
universities from releasing student disciplinary records.174
So while Congress has set out to undo much of the damage that has been
done, the effect of this legislation is yet unclear. In a recent newsletter circulated
at Miami University, the Office of Judicial Affairs reported that, "[tlhe
amendments to FERPA do not mandate public release of information from
student disciplinary records but they do allow institutions to disclose personally
identifiable information from disciplinary records of students. '175 Thus Miami
University has seized on the lack of any affirmative language requiring the
release information, and it is likely that other universities will do the same. It
may well be that the 1998 Amendments to the Higher Education Act, while
gaining some ground in the fight against campus crime, simply have not gone far
enough.
Thus notwithstanding the efforts made by Congress to deal with the growing
problem of campus crime, serious problems with the status quo persist.
University disciplinary boards have come to fulfill a unique and ever-expanding
role at many of the nation's colleges and universities. Once formed to deal with
minor infractions, college students now oversee adjudication of rapes, assaults,
and drug offenses with little or no legal expertise in these areas. Offenders suffer
only the most nominal of punishments, and victims, having been encouraged to
resolve the offenses through university disciplinary boards, are left to ponder the
ineffectiveness of a, system most are not even aware exists. Other students on the
campus remain ignorant of the dangers they face on a daily basis, and
administrators enthusiastically tout their schools as safe and secure places for
incoming students. The Buckley loophole provided this opportunity to the
administrators at Miami University, and it will continue to do so for the hundreds
of other colleges and universities across the country that have implemented these
secret tribunals.
building or property ... owned or controlled by an institution of higher education that is used
in direct support of, or in relation to, the institution's educational purposes, is used by students,
and is not within the same reasonably contiguous geographical area of the institution." Id.
§ 1092(f)(6)(A)(ii)(I), (II).
173 See id § 1092(f).
174 See id. § 951(2)(C) ("Nothing in this section shall-be construed to prohibit an
institution of postsecondary education from disclosing the final results of any disciplinary
proceeding conducted by such institution against a student who is an alleged perpetrator of any
crime of violence.").
175 Open Records Laws and Student Disciplinary Records, JUDICIAL AFFAIRs UPDATE,
Winter 1998, at 2. The Newsletter went on to report that, "[S]ince the amendments do not
mandate the release of information, careful consideration must be given to the broader issues
before policies are developed." Id. Clearly, Miami University does not see the 1998 legislation
as affirmatively requiring any disclosure.
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Now that lawmakers have been made aware of the conspiratorial state of
events on campuses across the nation, it is incumbent on them to address the
problem. Only comprehensive legislation that takes into account the existing
incentives for administrators to conceal crucial information will successfully
address the problem; HIR. 715, while a laudable effort, falls short of this goal. If
Congress is serious about exposing and reversing the cover-up of campus crime,
it will set itself to the task of drafting such comprehensive legislation.

